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Abstract: Fraud, waste, and abuse in the U.S. healthcare system are estimated at $700 billion annually. Predictive 
analytics offers government and private payers the opportunity to identify and prevent or recover such 
billings. This paper proposes a data-driven method for fraud detection based on comparative research, fraud 
cases, and literature review. Unsupervised data mining techniques such as outlier detection are suggested as 
effective predictors for fraud. Based on a multi-dimensional data model developed for Medicaid claim data, 
specific metrics for dental providers were developed and evaluated in analytical experiments using outlier 
detection applied to claim, provider, and patient data in a state Medicaid program. The proposed 
methodology enabled successful identification of fraudulent activity, with 12 of the top 17 suspicious 
providers (71%) referred to officials for investigation with clearly anomalous and inappropriate activity. 
Future research is underway to extend the method to other specialties and enable its use by fraud analysts. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Roughly $700 billion of the $2.7 trillion spent on 
healthcare in the US is attributable to fraud, waste, 
and abuse (Kelley 2009). Healthcare payers deal 
with fraudulent practitioners, organized criminal 
schemes, and honest providers who make 
unintended mistakes while billing for their 
legitimate services. Government programs are 
particularly susceptible to fraud, as it is harder to 
exclude problematic providers than in privately 
managed provider networks. Data analysis methods 
utilized in other sectors are not yet widely deployed 
and utilized in this domain, partially due to the high 
level of subject matter knowledge needed to adapt 
these techniques to the unique environments in 
which they must be deployed. Yet, with up-front 
engineering and ongoing adaptations, techniques 
such as outlier detection offer a lifeline to programs 
struggling to rein in spiraling costs and remain 
solvent.  
Unsupervised data mining techniques such as 
outlier detection are suggested as effective 
predictors for fraud. This paper proposes and 
evaluates a method for applying outlier detection to 
healthcare fraud based on comparative research, 
fraud cases, and literature review. Based on a multi-
dimensional data model developed for Medicaid 
claim data (Thornton et al. 2013), specific metrics 
for dental providers were developed and evaluated in 
analytical experiments using outlier detection 
applied to claim, provider, and patient data in an 
actual state Medicaid program. The proposed 
methodology successfully identified fraudulent 
activity, with 12 of the top 17 suspicious providers 
(71%) referred to officials for investigation with 
clearly anomalous and inappropriate activity. The 
research methodology of Hevner et al. (2004) was 
chosen to guide our work of designing a construct 
for fraud detection that should be improved and 
adapted based on environmental feedback and an 
evolving knowledge base. 
2 KNOWLEDGE BASE 
Existing literature discusses how electronic fraud 
detection could help combat health care fraud by 
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securing the claim input process, checking on 
irregularities, and analyzing claim data sets to search 
for behavioral indicators of fraud (Aral et al. 2012; 
Bolton & Hand 2002; Forgionne et al. 2000; Ortega 
et al. 2006). Unfortunately, due largely to the 
begrudging acknowledgement of fraud in health 
care, the complexity of the claim systems, the size 
and distributed storage of claim data and the late and 
relatively low funding for fraud detection, 
development of electronically fraud detection 
systems is lagging industries such as banking and 
telecommunications. There is a large base of 
statistical methods that are also used in other 
industries and could potentially be applied within the 
health care industry (Travaille et al. 2011). Some 
research reported specific fraud scheme detection 
using data mining approaches (Forgionne et al. 
2000; Major & Riedinger 2002; Musal 2010; Ng et 
al. 2010; Shin et al. 2012), however an outstanding 
challenge is to explore other healthcare fields for 
potential data mining possibilities and develop a 
more applied approach to this problem. 
Data mining is gaining more attention by 
researchers as a potential tool to find healthcare 
fraud more easily (Aral et al. 2012). Most of the 
studies consider outlier detection as one of the 
primary tools (Weng & Shen 2008). Researchers 
have combined multiple methodologies such as 
fuzzy logic in medical claims assessment and neural 
networks for automatic classification (Travaille et al. 
2011). In the early 2000’s, some initial concepts of 
data warehousing for data mining purposes in health 
care arose (Forgionne et al. 2000). Major and 
Riedinger (2002) developed an electronic fraud 
detection application to review providers on 27 
behavioral heuristics and compare those to similar 
providers. A provider score was calculated based on 
these heuristics followed by a frontier identification 
method to select providers as candidates for 
investigation. Another example identified a number 
of meaningful rare cases in pathology insurance data 
from Australia’s Health Insurance Commission 
using an on-line discounting learning algorithm 
(Yamanishi et al. 2004). In Taiwan scientists 
developed a detection model based on process 
mining that systematically identified practices 
derived from clinical pathways to detect fraudulent 
claims (Yang & Hwang 2006).  
In Canada, researchers used Benford’s Law 
Distributions to detect anomalies in claim 
reimbursements (Lu & Boritz 2005). Although the 
method did find some suspicious behavior, its 
potential for fraud identification seemed to be 
limited in this case. One of the main reasons is that 
Benford’s law uses overly frequently used first-
digits to find fraud. However, this does not 
necessarily apply to services with payer-fixed prices.  
In Chile, a private health insurance company 
built applications of neural networks used to find 
medical abuse and fraud (Ortega et al. 2006). The 
innovative aspects of the application concerned a 
method that could process the claims on a real time 
basis. Other examples are the application of 
association rule mining to examine billing patterns 
within a particular specialist group to detect these 
suspicious claims and potential fraudulent 
individuals (Shan et al. 2008) or the use of clustering 
procedures as well as regression models for 
geographical analysis of possible fraud (Musal 
2010).  
Ng et al. (2010) experimented on detecting non-
compliant consumers (prescription shoppers) in 
spatio-temporal health data of Medicare Australia 
using multiple metrics that flagged providers. 
Although beneficial experimental results were 
achieved and the authors consider spatial and 
temporal factors to be effective in metrics, 
significant benefits concerning the use of spatial-
temporal factors instead of more traditional metrics 
could not be verified. The simpler metrics, such as 
multiple visits or prescription percentages of 
pharmacy visits for drugs of concern, have proved 
valuable activity as well. Also Tang et al. (2011) 
described the problem of prescription shopping in 
their research. They used integrated techniques like 
feature selection, clustering, pattern recognition and 
outlier detection. Using a threshold on the outlier 
score provider groups could be marked as potential 
fraudulent.  
Iyengar et al. (2013) described a methodology 
for identifying and ranking candidate audit targets 
from prescription drugs. The researchers developed 
a normalized baseline behavioral model for each 
prescription area and searched for statistically 
significant deviations from that model. For some of 
the areas, up to 500 features were used to find 
anomalies. For the narcotic analgesics drug class, all 
the known cases of fraud were correctly identified 
by the model as being very abnormal and excessive.  
The research of Thornton et al. (2013) builds 
upon Sparrows fraud type classifications and 
developed a Medicaid multidimensional data schema 
and elaborated on analysis techniques that help to 
predict the likelihood of finding fraudulent activities.  
A scope and extent of health care fraud was 
described by Travaille et al. (2011) that provided an 
overview of the electronic fraud detection from other 
industries applicable to the health care industry. The 
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authors advocated the use of statistical methods for 
detection fraud and abuse for many of the health 
care areas, and gave insight in the multiple fraud 
schemes that are used by criminals in health care.  
The work of Phua et al. (2010) includes a 
comprehensive survey of data mining-based fraud 
detection research. He categorizes, compares and 
summarizes a decade of research papers about 
automated fraud detection. 
In general, the papers suggest and justify the 
applicability of data mining techniques in detecting 
healthcare fraud. Most describe the process of metric 
gathering, valuing and validation, and how dynamics 
force adaptation within a continuously changing 
environment. Most papers have a focus on a specific 
health care area, which seems to indicate a non-
homogeneous field for application. In search for 
generalizability we look for a common approach that 
can be extended and applied flexibly at scale. Our 
goal is to apply this methodology on the total set of 
Medicaid data, including over 70 million 
beneficiaries. Therefore, we need a generic approach 
to developing predictors for detection of healthcare 
fraud in multiple health specialties. 
3 ENVIRONMENT 
“Fraud is the intentional deception or 
misrepresentation that an individual knows to be 
false or does not believe to be true and makes, 
knowing that the deception could result in some 
unauthorized benefit to himself/herself or some 
other person” (Department of Health and Human 
Services 1998). In developing our metrics, model, 
and overall construct, we bear in mind this definition 
and set the goal for identifying provider-based 
fraudulent activity. Providers are the initiating actor 
for billing healthcare payers, and, as such, quickly 
become the nexus for fraud schemes. 
When a provider participates in Medicaid, the 
provider agrees to reimbursement by the state and 
submits claims for payment directly to the state or 
managed care entity. States operate claims 
processing systems that perform various prepayment 
checks and edits to inspect the claim’s legitimacy. 
Edits and audits verify information with honest 
providers in mind, but they are not designed to detect 
fraud schemes of any depth (Sparrow 2000). These 
systems simply cannot verify that the service was 
provided as claimed, that the diagnosis is correct, or 
whether the patient is even aware of the claimed 
services. 
Health care reimbursement policy varies state to 
state and even across different patient populations, 
meaning metrics and predictors of fraud in one state 
must be adapted to be relevant in the differing 
policies of another. In this paper, we focus on a 
generalizable model that can be applied across 
programs with differing parameters and settings 
applied to accommodate for policy and program 
differences.  
4 METHOD FOR APPLYING 
OUTLIER DETECTION TO 
HEALTHCARE FRAUD 
To best address the need for iterative metric review, 
adjustment processing, and iterative weighting 
modifications, we have developed an iterative 
process for applying outlier detection to healthcare 
fraud, shown in Figure 1. In the subsequent 
subsections, we will describe each phase of this 
process. 
4.1 Compose Metric Sets for Domains  
Metrics can be derived and designed in multiple 
ways: through case analysis, by literature review, by 
study of attributes in the data model, or by 
cooperation with businesses of an industrial sector. 
Although a case study may be an instrument that 
helps to create a set of metrics, evaluation of the 
metrics by means of experts and flagging results is 
an absolute necessity. The set of metrics chosen in 
this paper consists of metrics based on analyzed 
cases from the FBI (U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2013), metrics developed through 
discussions with healthcare fraud experts, and 
metrics found in existing literature (Musal 2010; Ng 
et al. 2010; Shin et al. 2012; Tang et al. 2011; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2012). To 
understand the process of fraud metric extraction we 
illustrate two examples of fraud cases that helped to 
design identifying metrics. 
First, in a recent fraud case in New Jersey, a 
physician and owner of a home-based physician 
services firm for seniors plead guilty for charging 
lengthy visits to elderly patients that they did not 
receive (District of New Jersey U.S. Attorneys 
Office 2013). The physician in dispute received at 
least half a million dollars and was eventually 
detected because he became the highest billing home 
care provider among over 24,000 doctors in New 
Jersey from January 1, 2008 through October 14, 
2011. Intentional over-billing for services, also 
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known as up-coding, is a typical behavior that can be 
detected using metrics. Derived from this case was 
the ‘visit length’ metric. The comparison of peers 
based on the proportion of each visit length could 
identify such fraud. The assumption is that criminal 
providers may claim a higher proportion of lengthy 
patient visits than their peers. 
Second, a Texas doctor owned a community 
medical center and falsely represented office visits 
and diagnostic test that were medically unnecessary 
from February 2010 until February 2011 (District of 
Texas U.S. Attorneys Office 2013). In exchange for 
submitting to diagnostic tests, patients at the clinic 
were prescribed controlled substances, incentivizing 
the patient to return for follow-up visits. The creation 
of fictitious symptoms provided the doctor reason to 
prescribe the narcotics and provided plausible 
rationale for ordering more tests. An indication for 
this type of fraud can potentially be found in the 
referral rate. Despite their apparent deteriorating 
condition, patients in this case would rarely be 
referred to an outside specialist, as this would 
obviously reveal that they are healthy. It might also 
be found in the amount and/or types of specific tests 
the doctors would prescribe to their patients as 
compared to peer physicians. A third telling metric 
could be patient retention and frequency of visits. 
Although most general physicians have returning 
patients, when a large proportion of patients return 
too often, this would seem quite suspicious and stand 
out as compared to peers. 
Metric identification is a complex task that 
requires the knowledge of both, the health care 
domain and statistical theory. In the metric design 
process, it requires more than analysis of fraud cases 
to find fraud indicators. A group of outliers will 
normally consist of some outliers based on statistical 
deviation, just by chance, which cannot be filtered 
within a single metric. Only when fraudulent 
providers will take a more deviant position in the 
group of outliers, normal providers may shift to the 
non-outlying group, leaving the ‘bad guys’ 
separated. However, there are always providers that 
will be classified as outliers, although they are not 
fraudulent, due to the fact that their practice actually 
differs too much from the closest comparable peer 
group. Filtering this non-fraudulent provider or 
moving them to alternate peer groups can be done, 
but it is difficult to impossible without significant 
understanding of the domain. 
 
Figure 1: Method for Applying Outlier Detection to Healthcare Fraud. 
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The set of metrics does not necessarily have to be 
large; on the contrary, often 25 to 30 features are 
sufficient. If hundreds of metrics have to be 
designed, the absolute amount of outliers is increased 
as well, which eventually will result in all providers 
displaying outlying behavior for some metrics. 
Metric identification is dependent on fraud experts 
and is an iterative process to find a set of metrics that 
works effectively. For our case study, we initially 
developed over 100 behavioral metrics. This list was 
subsequently refined to fifteen that could be applied 
to a relatively homogenous provider pool in the 
dental domain, feasible for implementation within 
our research case constraints. 
4.2 Clean and Filter Data 
This phase creates a workable set of data for the 
analysis. This consists of cleaning the data set and 
selecting only the relevant data of those providers to 
be analyzed. 
The first task relates to data quality, which has to 
be estimated in order to determine the precision of 
computations. Where data quality may be reduced by 
multiple influences, three main concerns are 
addressed. First, merging multiple databases of 
information about common entities is frequently 
encountered in large commercial and government 
organizations (Hernández & Stolfo 1998). Second, 
there is also the problem of entered data quality. 
Health insurance data is subject to quality problems 
in various ways. Data entry is often done by hand, 
which is shown to be inaccurate in about 4.4% in 
cases on personal information, and even higher 
percentages when abstracting data (Colin et al. 
1994). Third is the use of inaccurate data. Claims are 
often incorrectly submitted and adjusted afterwards. 
These claims should be removed if possible. Data 
cleansing is highly suggested prior to analysis. Data 
cleansing will process the data in order to detect and 
correct (or remove) corrupt or inaccurate records 
from the record set, table, or database. 
After cleaning, filtering is required—the task of 
selecting only that data which can be used for 
analysis. All data containing missing values that 
cause the inability to calculate metrics, should be 
removed or estimated with imputation. Claims that 
are voided from the system will be filtered out from 
the data set used for analysis. The result set of claim 
transaction data should meet the ISO 8000 data 
quality criteria, as far as possible, before continuing 
the analysis. 
4.3 Select Provider Groups, Compute 
Metrics 
Providers should be similar so that it is meaningful 
to compare their behavior. The main problem is that 
the more homogeneous a providers group is, 
comparison may be better delineate true outliers, 
however, the sample size of providers will decrease 
as well. Three questions arise. Is there a minimum 
sufficing data quantity that should qualify a provider 
for the metric? For example, a provider with only 2 
claims per month should probably be excluded. 
What is the minimum provider sample size 
acceptable to delineate outliers with reasonable 
certainty? A group of only 5 providers will likely not 
produce trustworthy comparisons. What provider 
characteristics can be used to group similar provider 
populations suitable for comparisons? Apart from 
operating within the same domain or sub-domain, 
other provider characteristics may influence the 
analysis, such as the provider size or volume of 
patients. If a cluster analysis is done to detect such 
differences, the cluster criteria would help identify 
these different groups. 
To apply metrics in analysis, calculations of those 
are performed and stored. The data time frame over 
which the metric is calculated must be defined. In 
our experiment we took a snapshot of provider 
behavior for each metric in a time frame.  
4.4 Compare Providers by Metric, Flag 
Outliers 
The analysis interval, the frequency to compute the 
metrics and perform the analysis, should be defined. 
A reasonable approach in our environment, in which 
new data is loaded monthly, is to calculate the 
metrics on a monthly basis. We defined 
requirements for the computational resources and for 
the subject matter experts. 
Next, the appropriate analysis techniques and/or 
outlier detection methods should be used for each of 
the metrics. Examples of analysis techniques used in 
our experiment were univariate analysis, multivariate 
analysis, time-series analysis, and box-plot analysis. 
The following outlier detection methods were used: 
deviation from regression model, deviation clusters, 
single deviations from clusters, trend deviations, and 
peak deviations, making use of both non-parametric 
and parametric deviations. In the figures 2–5 we will 
show some examples of the different analyses.  
Figure 2 shows the regression analysis between 
the total dollar amount reimbursed by Medicaid to a 
provider, and the number of reimbursed claims. The 
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Figure 2: Regression of Reimbursement pre Beneficiary. 
red line is the fitted linear model through the data 
points. The blue lines represent the 2.33 sigma’s 
deviation from the logical model. Provider 23481, 
plotted in the left top corner, was one of the 
providers that attracted attention, because of its 
severe outlying behavior, and would be an 
interesting candidate for further analysis to find the 
cause of higher average of this provider on 
reimbursements. 
Outliers influence sample means and deviations 
and therefore could mask themselves. This ‘masking 
effect’ could be reduced by robust estimation 
procedures (Rousseeuw & van Zomeren 1990). 
However, we did not use these unmasking 
procedures in this study. 
Figure 3 shows the boxplot outlier analysis by 
tooth code. Roughly 1–32 are adult teeth. The 
assumption is that providers that constantly perform 
treatments on the same tooth are interesting. 
Previous fraud cases mentioned examples of 
providers that claimed exact copies of procedures for 
different patients, to receive more reimbursements. 
These copies will be visible when we look at the 
tooth code, for example.  
Another type of fraud that might reveal from this 
analysis is the recursive treatment on a tooth. If a 
provider fills it with amalgam, repeats it with a 
correctional procedure, but finally pulls it and puts a 
replacement, many procedures were performed on 
the same tooth. Sometimes this happens because of 
misdiagnoses, estimation errors, or coincidence. We 
took provider 42953 that almost claimed 20% of its 
procedures on code 03, about a 140 procedures. To 
compare, the second most billed tooth of this 
provider appeared 27 times, all other teeth below 10. 
The procedures are spread over multiple patients, in 
general one or two per patient. Most of the 
procedures have code D0120, a periodic oral 
evaluation on an established patient. The procedures 
are nicely spread over the whole year, around 12 per 
month. 
Figure 4 shows the time series of a group of 
providers with outlying peaks. Those providers with 
a constant flow of claim submissions were compared 
to see if sudden increases in claim numbers could be 
found. The black dots represent the outlying peak 
that has been identified. One interesting finding is 
the green line (42748). The provider is not claiming 
for patients and suddenly around week 13, he claims 
over 300 patients per week. Simple explanations 
might be the use of multiple Medicaid provider IDs, 
or a wrong registration of specialty, namely the 
provider corresponds to a mobile dental practice.  
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Figure 3: Tooth Code Analysis. 
 
Figure 4: Peak Analysis: Time Series with Outliers of Reimbursed Claims. 
Another provider that lighted up on this figure was 
provider 75046. Questionable is the sudden peak in 
week 12 of 2013. The number of claims rises from 
around a 100 claims per week, to almost 300. After 
analysis on a service code level we found suspicious 
claims. Many children that visited the clinic that 
week received exactly the same treatments, only on 
different teeth. The combination of codes to reappear 
so frequently can’t almost be a coincidence and 
should definitely be further investigated. 
Figure 5 shows the combination of multivariate 
clustering and outlier detection. All data points 
exceeding the pink line represent 2.33 sigma’s 
deviation in the extreme y direction from the cluster 
mean. Marked outliers thus have a considerable high 
average of reimbursed claims per beneficiary. 
Several reasons are possible for this phenomenon; 
not all related to fraud. There could be strict 
examination intervals to provide the best care, where 
many people will see the dentist on a regular basis, 
although this is costly. The maximization of the 
reimbursement under Medicaid could be another 
reason for a high average. Looking at provider 6950, 
an analysis at the claim level was done. We found 
that the high claiming behavior was caused by the 
decoupling of services over multiple claims. When  
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Figure 5: Multivariate Clustering and Outlier Analysis. 
patient, service date, and treating dentists were 
identical, services were just send in as two claims. 
Does the provider decouple the claims to try to hide 
something, or is it an administrative error? 
4.5 Predictors Form Suspicion for 
Provider Fraud Detection 
An important aspect is how to report an anomaly and 
how to relate it to indication of fraud. Once an 
outlier criterion has been exceeded by a provider, we 
raise a flag for the provider in that period. A flag is 
the identification of an anomaly detected by the data 
mining algorithm. Scoring is the formula of the 
individual predictors for fraud detection based on the 
individual results of each of the outliers in provider 
analysis. The proposed scoring is a way of stacking 
suspicion. A single provider analytic will flag some 
honest providers. The assumption of using scoring to 
find the most interesting providers to investigate for 
fraud is that it will find those providers that are 
frequent outliers on multiple predictors.  
4.6 Report and Present to Fraud 
Investigators 
Fraud investigators need flexible reporting. In our 
view, there is no specific pre-defined way for 
reporting the data. A combination of dashboards and 
interactive multidimensional processing is therefore 
recommended. On the dashboard level we provide 
high level information on providers, by presenting 
the provider metric results, alerts on those providers 
that score deviant from others or on their history. 
Within comparative analysis, we enable 
investigators to drill down to the root of a claim to 
learn how deviations might have occurred and to 
collect the set of claims that needs further 
investigations. A list of alerts and their scores might 
be a starting point for investigators to begin their 
analysis. 
4.7 Metric Evaluation 
Evaluation of predictor effectiveness is required to 
make decisions for analyses and further metric 
developments. Measuring “success” is a difficult 
process since fraud is not established as fraud until 
after a litigation. Given the years of time lag, 
measuring convictions as justification for resource 
allocation and input for iterative improvement is 
suboptimal. Measuring investigations and audits 
initiated by fraud experts after internal review is 
certainly timelier and may be sufficiently reliable. If 
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fraud investigation initiations are chosen as 
evaluation statistics, we may use the formulas of 
precision and recall to calculate the effectiveness of 
the method. A downside is that fraud investigations 
might be systematically wrong initiated distorting 
the effectiveness measurements. Fraud convictions 
might eventually provide the contrary evidence, 
however, we believe that fraud experts are capable 
of interpreting these measurements meaningfully. 
Thresholds, or configuration of the outlier detection 
algorithms influence the classification of data points 
as outliers. Restrictive outlier groups may minimize 
the number of potential fraud, while less restrained 
classification lead to false positives. The trade-off 
may be measured in terms of precision and recall 
(Aggarwal 2013). 
5 EVALUATION: MEDICAID 
DENTAL PROVIDERS CASE 
STUDY 
We performed a case study in which dental claims 
were analyzed on 14 different metrics. The seven 
stages to develop a successful fraud detection tool 
were followed and one iterative cycle was 
completed. A study on dental fraud has not been 
reported so far in literature, although it represents a 
large part of the Medicaid healthcare expenses. 
Dentistry is also a large and homogeneous group of 
providers that fit the criteria for the developed 
methodology well. An attempt was made in 
selecting metrics fitting within multiple known 
categories where fraud could be found. 
5.1 Data, Metrics, and Parameters 
For the case study, 11 months of Medicaid records 
from July 2012 until May 2013 were used for 
analysis, containing about 650.000 dental claims. 
The start date was the first of April 2013. To 
enhance peer group homogeneity, we chose to take 
only regular dental providers without any specialty 
as our provider group. Before calculation, data was 
processed for adjustments and cleaned for entries 
containing incorrect data such as null values, zero 
dollar payments, adjustments without original 
claims, and future servicing dates. 
The metrics were computed using Oracle SQL 
Procedures and stored in database tables. Using the 
R language, scripts were developed to calculate and 
compare providers. The analyses developed in R 
made use of built-in functionality extended with 
statistical packages such a ’ggplot2’ and ’cluster’ 
required for functions such as fitting rule-based 
models, k-means algorithms, and boxplots. The 
application made use of a parameter file to configure 
the analysis by example set data filter criteria, outlier 
criteria, write back capabilities, and presentation 
characteristics. 
The minimum requirements for analysis varied 
over the different types of analyses, as some metrics 
required larger data sets to achieve significant 
results. The baseline for a provider to be taken for 
analysis was set to a minimum of either 10 unique 
beneficiaries or $10,000 reimbursed per month. 
Some of the predictors, such as the procedure code 
analysis, required a minimum service amount per 
year. 
In the regression analysis, a deviation of 2.33 
sigma from the underlying regression model was 
considered to be an outlier. In the univariate analysis 
we took the highest cluster, those providers that 
scored as a group the highest for the specific metric. 
In the multivariate analysis, using k-means 
clustering, outliers were defined by the outlier 
criteria, single data points deviating more than 2.33 
sigma in y direction from its belonging cluster, or 
outlier cluster if smaller than 5 items. Clusters were 
formed using the k-means algorithm, set to 10 
iterations. In the box-plots, the interquartile ranges 
defined the outlier criteria, configured for each 
metric separately. 
As described in the methodology, a scoring 
mechanism is suggested for pointing out the most 
interesting cases to investigate. The scoring 
algorithm would make use of the number of flags, 
the importance value that has been assigned to a flag, 
and partly of the provider flagging history. In this 
study, the history was ignored due to the limited 
length of the data set, and, as an initial full cycle, 
flags for each of the metrics were equally weighted 
to evaluate their impact and relevance. 
5.2 Results 
Beginning with a data set of over 500 dental 
providers, the set was narrowed to roughly 360 
providers through selection criteria. After 
performing the analysis, only 35 providers raised 2 
or more of the potential 14 predictive flags. 17 
providers raised 3 or more flags. We focused on 
these 17 providers to evaluate the potential efficacy 
of the approach.  
We interviewed qualified healthcare fraud subject 
matter experts to evaluate the claims of and the 
raised flags by these 17 providers. While some of the 
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flags could be understood as acceptable given the 
types of services rendered or due to the provider’s 
operating environment, there was a preponderance of 
evidence suggesting that at least 12 of these 17 
providers (71%) with three or more flags should be 
immediately referred for audit and potentially to law 
enforcement. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
We structure our design science contribution 
according to the Hevner et al. (2004) framework and 
address a relevant problem in healthcare fraud 
detection. This paper offers an artifact and a 
description of a method for applying outlier 
detection to healthcare fraud along with an 
evaluation of this model in practice to a state-wide 
database of actual healthcare claims with over 500 
providers. The model is evaluated by applying it in 
practice to actual healthcare data and having experts 
review the results of the analysis. The paper 
contributes to the literature by providing a roadmap 
for future applications of outlier detection in 
healthcare and potentially other corollary domains. 
We used the domain context of Medicaid and 
discussed considerations for its use in different data 
contexts. We communicated the model to 
stakeholders, including applying the overall process 
and specific scoring methods in practice.  
Through this research, we learned many insights 
about antifraud efforts. Extensive healthcare subject 
matter expertise is required to design analysis 
techniques and interpret their results. Identifying 17 
out of 360 (5%) primary dental providers for further 
investigation, of which 12 of 17 (71%) have been 
evaluated and deemed appropriate for formal 
investigation can be considered a successful 
outcome. As compared with prior comparative 
success rates of roughly 10% (Major & Riedinger 
2002), we see great opportunity in building upon this 
model in various ways. Future research will dive 
deeper, including evaluating specific outlier 
techniques relevant to different types of healthcare 
fraud, and look more broadly at methods and models 
for storing and preserving the scoring metadata and 
provenance information to allow for more automated 
scoring, model adaptability, and reconstruction. With 
this research we hope to both advance the state of the 
art in healthcare fraud detection and prevention, as 
well as materially assist tax payers and law 
enforcement in confronting this important societal 
challenge. 
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